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 
Abstract-In recent years, industries increase their flexibility, 
fasten their response, and enhance concurrent engineering 
design to react to shorter product life cycle and highly 
customization. To achieve these prospects, supply chain 
collaboration becomes a pertinent strategy for industries to 
strengthen their competitiveness. A well constructed 
collaboration between supply chain organizations will enhance 
trust between supply chain partners and reduce process time 
in complicated procedure. Moreover, a valid collaboration will 
consolidate the sharing of information, cost, profit, and risk 
within partners so that reducing inventory level and 
increasing on-time delivery can be achieved. However, some 
uncertainties within collaborative partners such as cost 
allocation, cost information, and methodology of decision 
making are difficult to be compromised and will affect the 
relationship between partners. Therefore, equally negotiation 
between collaborative partners in these uncertainties will 
resolve these uncertainties and have significant effect on 
supply chain collaboration. Hence, this research analyzes the 
effect of negotiation between echelons on supply chain 
collaboration. Mathematical models are developed to realize 
the significance of effect in using negotiation within collaboration. 
Our results shows that total cost can be reduced and customer 
satisfaction will be increased with the appropriate negotiation with 
in supply chain collaborative partners. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, the rising competitive environment with 
shorter product life cycle and highly customization force 
industries to increase their flexibility, fasten their response, 
and enhance concurrent engineering design. To integrate 
these prospects, supply chain collaboration becomes a 
pertinent strategy for industries to strengthen their 
competitiveness. A well constructed collaboration between 
supply chain organizations will enhance trust between 
supply chain partners and reduce process time in 
complicated procedure between them. Moreover, a valid 
collaboration will consolidate the sharing of information, 
cost, profit, and risk within partners so that reducing 
inventory level, and increasing on-time delivery and 
customer satisfaction can be achieved. 
To integrate supply chain, objectives such as minimum 
cost and maximum customer satisfaction are always 
projected. However, these objectives are usually affected 
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because of miscommunication between buyers and 
suppliers. Miscommunication between supply chain 
echelons might increase inventory levels of each echelon 
and causes the increment of cost. To reduce 
miscommunication, strategic alliance and information 
sharing are usually adapted for integrating supply chain. 
However, some information such as capacity planning, 
product design, and forecasting are classified for each 
company and will not be shared for supply chain partners. 
Hence, negotiation between supply chain alliances might 
bring vantages to collaborate information sharing so that 
the total profit of supply chain alliances can be achieved.   
Furthermore, there are two types of supply chain partners 
in negotiation, cooperative and competitive. Different types 
of supply chain partners will have different strategies in 
resolving problems within supply chain. Although different 
strategies are adopted in negotiation, same objectives of 
distributing benefit and cost around supply chain are 
obtained. Moreover, negotiation through supply chain 
partners will assure the decision of maximizing the total 
profit of the supply chain but not the maximization of the 
total profit for each company. Therefore, this research 
develops a mathematical model to optimize supply chain 
profit with considerations of uncertainties in supply chain 
negotiation. Furthermore, capacity planning, demand of 
buyers and suppliers, production planning, distribution 
planning and purchasing are discussed within this proposed 
model. This research is organized as followed. Section 1 is 
the introduction of this research while Section 2 discusses 
the literature reviews. Section 3 demonstrates the 
developed model of this research and Section 4 shows the 
conclusion.  
 
2. Literature Review 
In recent years, the development of supply chain has 
focused on linking, integration, and collaboration that 
extend the range of efficiency from the internal company to 
suppliers and customers. Olhager [12] addresses the total 
product structure with the initial raw materials to the 
ultimate final product and the supply chain lead-time 
efficiency. A JIT perspective is examined to focus on 
linking mechanisms between successive companies and the 
collective efficiency of the supply chain. 
Nowadays, the competition is more between supply 
chains than between companies. In this respect it is 
important for any manufacturing firm to make sure that 
their partner companies are with the good performance and 
the organizations have the same view to measure values 
and competitiveness of the final products on the market. In 
this environment, selecting a set of potential partners has 
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Simatupang and Sridharan [14] thought that the 
exchange of information and the use of collaborative 
methods do not guarantee an immediate success. The more 
partners need to work together, the more time and money 
will have to be spent to ensure a viable collaboration. 
Moreover, the partnership will not continue if one of the 
members does not obtain enough gains or if a participant 
attempts to divert the collaboration in his favor. To avoid 
this kind of situation, Simatupang and Sridharan [14] 
realized that it is often necessary to use incentives such as 
pricing agreements or quantity discounts to influence actor 
decisions and tend towards an optimization of the global 
network. 
Emberson, et al. [4] presents a critique of the normative, 
buyer–supplier literature and in addition suggests that the 
more empirically based literature needs to expand its scope 
of attention beyond its traditional confines. Four main 
deficiencies are identified within much of the existing 
buyer–supplier literature. Lambert et al. [8] presented 
supply chain partnerships in an attempt to reduce costs, 
improve service and gain competitive advantage. Lambert 
et al. [8] provides a model which can be used to determine 
whether a partnership is warranted and how close of a 
partnership is warranted. Anderson and Narus [1] pointed 
out that a successful work partner's relation contains six 
keys and cooperate a partner of the relation depend on trust, 
communication and cooperation, and solving conflict. 
Hagedoorn [6] pointed out that the partnership can be 
divided into strategic and non-strategic partnership. The 
difference is the goals and motives. If the cooperation is 
based on a strategic basis, the relative supply chain 
partnership is also dependent on relative. If he chooses to 
keep this information for himself, the producer will have to 
plan the production based on merchant orders and not on 
the real demand of printers. This lack of information can 
lead to inefficient utilization of capacity, stock in excess or 
shortages, poor quality of service, etc., throughout the 
network [9]. Therefore, in an ideal world, supply chain 
partners should share their knowledge so as to decrease 
negative effects of decentralized planning. 
Talluri and Baker [17] propose a multi-phase 
mathematical programming approach for effective supply 
chain design. It considers potential suppliers, manufacturers, 
and distributors, and evaluates their efficiencies based on 
multiple factors in phase 1 and designs the supply chain 
network at an aggregate level by matching supply and 
demand of all potential nodes in phase 2. Phase 3 involves 
the initial deployment plans, which identifies the optimal 
routing of material from selected suppliers to manufacturers 
to warehouses by minimizing the total cost. According to 
the results, they obtain several partners with good 
performance. 
Gaining a competitive advantage in international supply 
chains requires matching the value-adding activities of a 
chain with the unique comparative advantages. A supply 
chain manager must identify and control the factors that 
affect the performance of the chain in each of the three 
areas, that is, procurement, processing and distribution. 
Prasad and Sounderpandian [13] provide a checklist of 
factors and offer suggestions for international supply chain 
managers to gain competitive advantage. 
Feng and Yamashiro [5] presented an approach consisted 
of three stages, qualitative pre-qualification, quantitative 
evaluation, and comprehensive examination. They 
addressed the problem of manufacturing as a product in a 
virtual enterprise environment and decided the optimal 
process-plant combination. Simchi-Levi et al. [15] 
described business activities within supply chain into three 
levels, that is, strategic, tactical, and operating.   
Supply chain management have been investigated in 
various areas and some research have studied the 
negotiation process between two or more partners in order 
to develop a planning model with minimum information 
exchange ([3] [7], [19]). Zartman [20] thought that 
negotiation is a decision-making process and participants 
must be from a number of possible options. However, the 
final decision is not depended on a negotiator. All 
negotiators have mutually influence to the decision-making 
within the supply chain. 
Simon [16] defined a complete and rational 
decision-making process with four main stages, defining 
the target problem, to develop a variety of possible options , 
possible from a variety of possible options to choose the 
best program, and implementation. Lai [10] demonstrated 
the activity in the negotiation with several characteristics. 
First of all, it involves two or more members and 
negotiation process will be more complicated if more 
members are included. Second, there is an obvious or 
potential interest among members. Third, the dependence 
of negotiations among the members will have impact on the 
negotiation process and final decision. Fourth, if the 
negotiation did not resolve the question among members, a 
final decision will not be drawn.   
Talluri et al. [18] constructed a two-phase quantitative 
framework to aid the decision-making process in 
effectively selecting an efficient and compatible set of 
partners. Cakravastia et al. [2] constructed a two-stage 
model for the design of supply chain networks. In this 
model, the performance of the supply chain is analyzed at 
two levels of decision-making, chain and operational level. 
At the chain level, objectives associated with each criterion 
are set for each stage of the supply chain meets the 
customer’s target. At the operational level, the 
manufacturing and logistical activities of each potential 
supplier are optimized in a way that matches the customer’s 
target. Their model obtains several suppliers with good 
performance for each of upstream layers. 
 
3. Methodology 
This research will analyze the effect of negotiation 
between echelons on supply chain collaboration. 
Mathematical models are developed to realize the 
significance of effect in using negotiation within 
collaboration and demonstrate the decision making of 
partners in achieving minimum cost of supply chain. 
Furthermore, mathematical models are developed based on 
Dudek and Stadtler [3] and Lehoux et al. [11]. In Dudek 
and Stadtler [3], planning decisions such as purchasing, 
production, transportation, and inventory holding are 
concerned in the mathematical model. Their objective 
function is to minimize the total cost of fulfilling customer 
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constraints. Lehoux et al. [11] investigated the 
collaboration in pulp and paper industry. A decision model 
is developed based on Collaborative Planning, Forecasting 
and Replenishment (CPFR) method to minimize total cost 
while capacity constraints are satisfied.   
However, their research assumes a real collaboration 
between partners and the exchange of all the information. 
Real collaboration might not be practical in the supply 
chain and bargain power should be implemented to 
determine the level of a particular company within 
negotiation process. Bargain power can be determined 
based on the size, capital flows, and experiences of a 
company. Therefore, this research inserts bargain power as 
a factor into negotiation model so that the effect of different 
level of companies within negotiation can be realized. Two 
mathematical models, buyer model and supplier model, are 
provided. Moreover, the buyer will initiate production plan 
for both buyer and supplier after receiving orders from 
customers. The buyer will pass the production plan to the 
supplier and supplier will evaluate the production plan 
based on its capacity, inventory, and production situations. 
The supplier might pass the adjusted production plan back 
to the buyer and the buyer should determine if this proposal 
is acceptable. The agreement will be drawn until the 
production plan is optimized from both the buyer and the 
supplier. The ideas of mathematical models are 
demonstrated as follows. 
 
Parameters: 
Hr: inventory cost of retailer 
Iro: initial inventory of retailer 
Lr: lower bound of order quantity of retailer 
Dr: demand of retailer 
Ur: upper bound of order quantity of retailer 
Pro: price lower bound of retailer 
Qro: order quantity of retailer with price of Pro 
α: bargain power of supplier 
Hs: inventory cost of supplier 
Iso: initial inventory of supplier 
Us: upper bound of order quantity of retailer 
Pso: price lower bound of retailer 
Qso: manufacturing quantity of supplier with price of Pso 
 
Decision variable 
Pr: purchasing price of retailer 
Qr: order quantity of retailer 
Ir: inventory of retailer 
Ps: selling price of supplier 
Qs: manufacturing quantity of supplier 
Is: inventory of supplier 
 
Retailer model: 
r r r r H I Q P  Z in       
(1) 
s.t  
r r ro r D - Q I I     (2) 
r r r U Q L     (3) 
r r L D    (4) 
r ro P P    (5) 
a
-1
ro
r
r ro Q
Q
P P  


 


    (6) 
Constraint (1) minimizes the total cost while constraints 
(2), (3), (4), (5), and (6) generate the purchasing quantities, 
price, and inventory under the limitation of capacity. This 
model will pass the expected price and quantities to 
supplier so that supplier can decide whether to accept the 
proposal or start negotiation. The supplier model is 
demonstrated as follows. 
 
Supplier model: 
s s s s H I - Q P   MaxZ      (7) 
s.t.  
r s so s D - Q I I     (8) 
s s r U Q Q     (9) 
r s P P    (10) 
a
1
-
so
s
s so Q
Q
P P  


 


    (11) 
The supplier will evaluate the proposal presented from 
buyer and generate its own production plan. Constraint (7) 
maximizes the total profit of the supplier while constraints 
(8), (9), (10), and (11) generate the producing quantities, 
selling price, and inventory under the capacity limitation. If 
the production plan is similar to buyer’s proposal, then the 
supplier will accept the proposal. If the production plan is 
different than the buyer’s proposal, then the supplier will 
pass the new production plan to the buyer and start the 
negotiation. The agreement will be drawn until the 
production for the supplier or for the buyer is acceptable. 
However, there is no guarantee of achieving the agreement 
with this negotiation. The bargain power will be a factor 
associated with the production plan and price that is 
demonstrated in constraint (11). It represents the will to 
adjust its own production plan and number of holding 
inventory.  
Figure 1 demonstrates the flow of the negotiation. Once 
the order arrives, the retailer will optimize its own price and 
purchasing quantities and pass these information to the 
supplier. The supplier will optimize its own price and 
producing quantities based on the retailer’s proposal. If the 
supplier cannot achieve optimum solution, it will decide 
whether to adjust it price and production plan or reject the 
retailer’s proposal. If the supplier adjusts its price and 
production plan and accepts the retailer’s proposal, the 
negotiation is finalized. If the supplier decides to reject the 
retailer’s proposal and propose its own plan to the retailer, 
the successful of this negotiation will be based on the 
retailer’s decision. The negotiation will continue until the 
proposal is accepted by the retailer and the supplier or is 
rejected by the retailer or the supplier. 
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Figure 1: Negotiation flow 
 
 
4. Cases study and Conclusion 
To test the usefulness of the proposed models, real data 
of DRAM and Notebook are adapted in the optimization. 
Seven types of bargain power are applied to realize the 
effect of the bargain power on the results of negotiation for 
the retailer and the supplier. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 describe 
the result and insights of these two cases.   
4.1 DRAM   
Table 1 demonstrates the price of DRAM after 
negotiation. In table 1, no price is equivalent in different 
combinations of bargain power for the supplier and the 
retailer. If both supplier and the retailer are not willing to 
adjust their price, the negotiation will be terminated 
without any agreement. If the supplier or the retailer can 
relax their price for about 1%, then the retailer and the 
supplier might reach agreement with bargain power of 4.5 
to 7.5 and 1.5 to 7.5, respectively. 
 
 
Table 1: DRAM price after negotiation based on different 
bargain power 
Supplier\
retailer  2.5 3.5 4.5 5.5 6.5 7.5 
1.5 140\1
44 
128\1
30 
122\1
23 
128\1
18 
129\1
15 
125\1
13 
2.5 140\1
44 
128\1
30 
122\1
23 
119\1
18 
116\1
15 
119\1
13 
3.5 140\1
44 
128\1
30 
122\1
23 
119\1
18 
116\1
15
115\1
13 
4.5 140\1
44 
128\1
30 
122\1
23 
119\1
18 
116\1
15
114\1
13 
5.5 140\1
44 
128\1
30 
122\1
23 
119\1
18 
116\1
15
114\1
13
6.5 140\1
44 
128\1
30 
122\1
23 
119\1
18 
116\1
15
114\1
13
7.5 140\1
44 
128\1
30 
122\1
23 
119\1
18 
116\1
15
114\1
13 
 
Table 2 shows the quantities of DRAM after negotiation. 
In table 2, the supplier and the retailer achieve agreement in 
quantities produced and purchased. Tables 1 and 2 indicate 
that agreement will be achieved if both sides can relax their 
price constraint.   
 
Table 2: DRAM quantities (in thousand) after negotiation 
based on different bargain power 
Supplier\
retailer  2.5 3.5 4.5 5.5 6.5 7.5 
1.5 15.00
1/15.
001 
15.01
3/15.
013 
15.01
9/15.
019 
15.01
3/15.
013 
15.01
2/15.
012 
15.01
6/15.
016 
2.5 15/15  15/15  15.00
1/15.
001 
15.00
4/15.
004 
15.00
7/15.
007 
14.92
3/14.
923 
3.5 15/15  15/15  15/15  15/15  15/15 15.00
1/15.
001
4.5  15/15 15/15 15/15  15/15  15/15 15/15
5.5  15/15 15/15 15/15  15/15  15/15 15/15
6.5  15/15 15/15 15/15  15/15  15/15 15/15
7.5  15/15 15/15 15/15  15/15  15/15 15/15
 
4.2 Notebook 
Table 3 demonstrates the results of negotiation between 
notebook supplier and retailer with different bargain power. 
Note that bargain power of 5.5 to 7.5 is not applied for the 
retailer and the supplier since the negotiation is stopped 
within the first proposal from the retailer. In table 3, no 
price is equivalent in different combinations of bargain 
power for the supplier and the retailer. If both supplier and 
the retailer are not willing to adjust their price, the 
negotiation will be terminated without any agreement. If 
the supplier or the retailer can relax their price for about 1%, 
then the retailer and the supplier might reach agreement 
with bargain power of 4.5 and 1.5 to 7.5, respectively.   
 
Table 3: Notebook price after negotiation based on different 
bargain power 
Supplier\
retailer 2.5 3.5 4.5 
1.5  1480.3\1526.
8 
1397.2\1415.
8 
1341.1\1345.
8 
2.5  1477.2\1523.
5  1353.9\1372 1291.5\1296 
3.5  1477.2\1523.
5 
1353.9\1372  1290\1294.5 
4.5  1477.2\1523.
5 
1353.9\1372  1290\1294.5 
 
Table 4 shows the quantities of DRAM after negotiation. 
In table 4, the supplier and the retailer achieve agreement in 
quantities produced and purchased. Tables 1 and 2 indicate 
that agreement will be achieved if both sides can relax their 
price constraint. 
 
 
 
Order arrives 
Retailer proposes 
its optimum price 
and quantities 
Supplier evaluates 
retailer’s proposal
acceptance 
Achieve negotiation  acceptance 
Stop negotiation 
Supplier proposes 
its optimum price 
and quantities 
Supplier evaluates 
retailer’s proposal 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Adjust proposal 
Yes 
No 
No 
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different bargain power 
Supplier\
retailer  2.5 3.5 4.5 
1.5 754/754 837/837 893/893 
2.5 750/750 750/750  754/754 
3.5  750/750  750/750  750/750 
4.5  750/750  750/750  750/750 
 
Supply chain collaboration has been studied to achieve 
minimum cost among supply chain partners. However, 
conflicts among objectives of supply chain partners are 
usually existed that affect the successfulness of 
collaboration. Therefore, negotiation is usually adapted 
among supply chain partners to achieve an appropriate 
decision. This research investigates the relation of partners 
within in supply chain alliance based on negotiation. 
Mathematical models are provided to minimize the total 
cost of supply chain and to realize the insights of 
implementing negotiation. Based on our model analysis, 
negotiation might reach a decision among supply chain 
partners. 
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